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People struggle with temptation in their everyday lives. Research often attributes failures 
in self-regulation to overwhelming and uncontrollable impulses. However, research also supports 
the idea that cognitive factors (e.g., justification) can license tempting behavior and allow 
individuals to behave in ways that run counter to their long-term goals. In addition, it is likely 
that affect plays a role in justification-based self-control failure. The current set of three studies 
investigated the role of affect in justification-based self-control failure. Study 1 tested the 
prediction that recall of past successes would result in increased positive affect.  Study 2 assessed 
whether justification results in an increased propensity to engage in temptation following a 
hypothesized increase in positive affect. In addition, attention to emotion was hypothesized to 
facilitate self-control (i.e., resulted in the selection of a healthy food item). Study 3 tested an 
alternative prediction that justification increases both the subjective enjoyment of food and 
positive emotion experienced during food consumption. Finally, it was hypothesized that 
individual differences (e.g., emotional reactivity, trait self-control) may moderate the relationship 
between justification and self-control failure. Across the three studies, results indicated that 
thinking about past healthy choices did not consistently result in increased positive affect. We 
also found that participants who thought about past healthy choices were more likely to select a 
healthy, rather than unhealthy, food item compared to individuals in both a positive affect and 
control condition. Finally, thinking about past healthy choices did not result in increased positive 
affect during indulgence, nor did it increase subjective food enjoyment during imaginal 
consumption. Overall, results suggest recall of past healthy behavior does not consistently 
increase positive affect, nor does it increase the likelihood one will engage in temptation. 










Ó2018 by Morgan Hill 






Table of Contents 
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………..…1 
 Dual Process Model of Self-Control………………………………...…………………….1 
 Justification and Self-Control……………………………………………………………..2 
 Emotion and Self- Control………………………………………………………………...6 
 Emotion, Justification, and Self-Control…………………………..……………………...8  
























 The Link Between Justification and Positive Affect…………………………………….37 
 Justification vs. Self-Licensing: Are They Distinct Processes?.…………………………38  
 Justification and Enjoyment……………………………………………………………...42 
Strengths and Limitations………………………………………………………………..43 








People face a number of temptations in their daily lives. Whether it is resisting the urge to 
lash out at a coworker, overindulging in a tempting dessert, or participating in a morally 
questionable activity, opportunities to forgo pleasure and work towards a longer-term goal are 
undoubtedly present in our everyday lives. When faced with a tempting situation, an individual 
can react in one of two ways: (1) “give in” to the temptation, which results in immediate 
gratification, or (2) use self-regulation to resist the temptation, which prevents immediate 
gratification, but allows the individual to remain in accordance with a long-term goal.  This 
process is what is described by the term self-control: one’s ability to forgo temptation and 
engage in the effortful pursuit of a long-term goal (Hofmann, Kotabe, & Luhmann, 2013).   
Dual Process Model of Self-Control 
Most models of self-control failure posit that individuals give in to temptation as a result 
of an overpowering “hot” or impulsive system, especially when one has already exerted self-
control (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Muraven & Slessareva, 2003). Specifically, the dual process 
model of self-control asserts that two key systems are involved in the ability to regulate one’s 
behavior: an impulsive or “hot” system, and a reflective or “cool” system (Hofmann, Friese, & 
Strack, 2009; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). While the impulsive system is rapid and automatic, the 
reflective system operates in a slower, more controlled fashion. As a result, the impulsive system 
requires less cognitive capacity when compared to the more cognitively taxing reflective 
processes. From a cursory view of this theory, it is clear that an overactive “hot” system will 
likely result in impulsive, discordant behavior. However, when an individual possesses sufficient 
cognitive resources, the reflective system is able to override impulsive behavior. As a result, 





Friese, & Wiers, 2008). Notably, this model also asserts that overwhelming impulses impede or 
prevent a person’s ability to engage in reflection and restraint, both of which are typically 
construed as antecedents to logical behavior (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). Thus, a majority of the 
research praises the reflective system while indicting the under-controlled impulsive system as 
responsible for self-control failure (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Pizzaro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 
2003).  
Justification and Self-Control 
In contrast, recent research suggests that the reflective system may also contribute to self-
control failure (De Witt Huberts, Evers & De Ridder, 2012, 2014). This process is called 
justification, and it is defined as the application of reasons for self-regulation failure before 
engaging in the tempting behavior (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014). The provision of an 
“acceptable” reason is believed to reduce inner conflict surrounding the choice to engage in an 
ego-dystonic and tempting behavior. A similar process, rationalization, is defined as the post-hoc 
generation of a reason for one to engage in a tempting behavior (Brown et al., 2011). Thus, 
people may justify their behavior beforehand (leading to an increased propensity to engage in a 
questionable behavior) or rationalize their behavior after the act is complete.  
Both justification and rationalization stem from prior work in the moral licensing domain, 
which posit that individuals “allow” themselves to engage in morally questionable behavior 
when they recall prior altruistic behavior (Merrit, Effron, & Monin, 2000). Rationalization is 
likely reinforcing; however, it is not likely an overt use of reasoning processes during the 
decision-making process as it occurs after self-control failure.  Past research on these specific 
reasoning processes (e.g., justification, rationalization) has typically focused on issues of 





Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009) and how individuals justify their decisions when engaging in 
morally questionable behavior. The provision of a reason (via justification) gives license for one 
to engage in questionable behaviors.  For example, in a study examining moral licensing and 
altruism (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009), participants were first exposed to a single list of 
words of either positive, negative, or neutral valence. Following exposure to the list, they were 
then asked to write a story about themselves and to include the words from the given list. Thus, 
participants were primed to think of themselves in either a positive, negative, or neutral light. 
After a filler task, participants were then asked if they would like to make a donation (up to $10) 
to a charity of their choosing.  The dependent variable was the amount of money participants 
chose to hypothetically donate to charity.  Results indicated that participants primed to think of 
themselves in a positive light were both less likely to donate money overall, and to donate less 
money when compared to those in both the neutral and negative conditions. Thus, it appeared 
that moral licensing “allowed” participants to take a pass with regard subsequent altruistic 
behavior; they felt as if they were justified in their actions.  
While the previous study examined reasoning processes via moral licensing, it did not 
examine justification with regard to a self-control decision (i.e., a decision between a temptation 
and perseverance toward a long-term goal). Additional studies have attempted to inch closer to 
actual processes related to self-control. For example, in one study (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014), 
participants were asked to rate how tempted they were by a new candy bar. Then, participants 
were asked to assist in a “thought listing” task, which would ostensibly help the creators market 
the new product. Participants were instructed to select up to thirty different reasons that would 
allow them to consume the indulgent food.  Results indicated that temptation predicted the 





stimulus, the more likely individuals are to reason themselves into approaching the temptation. 
Thus, the reflective process of motivated reasoning appeared to influence participants’ decisions, 
suggesting that greater reflective functioning via more reasons contributed to self-control failure. 
While this study investigated the effect of temptation on justification-related cognitions, it used 
reasons for the dependent variable (i.e., reasons as opposed to actual behavioral outcomes). In 
addition, both of these studies (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014; Sachdeva et al., 2009) looked at 
reasoning processes with regard to domains other than self-control. Additional research is 
needed to investigate the role of justification specifically (as opposed to moral licensing) on self-
control outcomes.  
 We recently conducted a vignette study to evaluate the effect of justification processes 
on self-control via a licensing manipulation (Hill & Veilleux, in preparation). We conducted an 
online scenario study in which undergraduates (N = 237) were asked to respond to questions 
about a hypothetical student (“Taylor”) who values health and physical fitness. In this study, 
participants had to indicate whether Taylor decided to either go home and do nothing (self-
control failure) or to go to the gym (self-control success). We randomly assigned participants to a 
justification condition, where the justification group learned that Taylor remembered eating a 
salad for lunch and thus had already engaged in “healthy behavior” that day, or a control group 
which did not mention past success. It was hypothesized that individuals in the justification 
condition would “allow” Taylor to forgo an activity consistent with a long-term goal of weight 
loss (e.g., going to the gym) in favor of a more pleasurable activity (e.g., going home).  Results 
revealed that, as predicted, individuals in the justification condition were more likely to think 





preliminary evidence that use of justification, specifically, thoughts of past success in the realm 
of self-control, may lead to greater self-control failure.  
Theories in the realm of substance use and eating also lend credence to the idea that 
conscious cognitive processes contribute to self-control failure. In the case of both eating 
behavior and substance use, individuals often perceive any failure as a reason for complete return 
to the initial problematic behavior (i.e., “Because I had a drink, I have failed at my goal of 
abstinence, so I might as well just go back to drinking a lot”). Originally termed the “abstinence 
violation effect” by Marlatt and Gordon (1985), this tendency to forgo a long-term goal after 
failure often results in a decreased tendency to persevere in the face of temptation. A similar 
phenomenon, known as the “What the hell effect” exists in the eating domain (Polivy & Herman, 
1985). Notably, the abstinence violation effect often results in a constellation of negative 
cognitions and emotions following indulgence (Grillo & Shiffman, 1994). This cognitive error is 
related to justification in that both attributions seem to give an individual permission to act out of 
accordance with their long-term goals. The difference lies in the individual’s use of justification 
in the presence of past successes or recent failures. Individuals may engage in justification by 
recalling past successes (i.e., “I deserve to indulge because I’ve been successful in the past) or 
based on recent failure (i.e., “I might as well indulge because I’ve already failed). Thus, moral 
licensing and the abstinence violation effect may be different sides of the same justification coin. 
Evidence appears to suggest that rational processes, in line with the dual-process model of self-
control (e.g., self- licensing, justification), can lead to self-control failure (De Witt Huberts et al., 







Emotion and Self-Control 
 Extant research supports the notion that negative affect plays a significant role in self-
regulation failure (Evers, Stok, & De Ridder, 2010; Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000). We also know 
that self-regulation failures often result in negative affect (“I was unable to resist the urge to eat 
the chocolate cake”; Marlatt & Gordon, 1980). From a learning perspective, it would seek to 
reason that feelings of shame or guilt would discourage one from engaging in a behavior in the 
future, yet we know people continue to engage in impulsive behavior despite the negative 
emotional consequences (Wohl, Pychyl, & Bennett, 2010). Pleasure associated with a temptation 
can be fleeting; thus, giving in to temptation may feel good in the moment and result in negative 
feelings after the fact. If we assume that people strive to maximize pleasure and minimize pain, it 
makes sense that people would also engage in behaviors that result in positive emotions (Tamir, 
2009). Because temptations often involve immediate pleasure (and delayed consequences), 
individuals are often left in a state of conflict – they simultaneously want to engage in a 
temptation to feel good and not feel bad about doing so.  
Thus, both positive and negative emotions appear to be involved in self-control 
processes. This is consistent with prior research examining positive and negative urgency, or 
one’s tendency to act impulsively while in either a positive or negative affective state (Cyders et 
al., 2007; Whiteside & Lynam, 2001). In other words, the experience of positive or negative 
emotions may make the ability to resist temptation in favor of a long-term goal exceptionally 
difficult for certain individuals. In addition, simply paying attention to one’s current emotional 
state can influence self-control decisions. In one study (Veilleux & Skinner, 2016), smokers were 
randomly assigned to view a set of neutral or smoking images. For each image, half of the 





participants completed a set of filler questions. Both groups then completed a delay discounting 
task, which required participants to choose between a smaller, more immediate reward and a 
larger, yet delayed reward (Duckworth & Kern, 2011). Smokers who completed the questions on 
craving and affect (i.e., those required to attend to their current state) were more likely to choose 
the smaller, more immediate reward (i.e., an index of self-control failure).  
Veilleux and colleagues (2018) conducted a similar study of craving, affect, and self-
control in a sample of restrained and unrestrained eaters. Restrained eaters tend to cognitively 
monitor and restrict their food intake, while unrestrained eaters typically pay attention to internal 
hunger cues to regulate eating (Fedoroff et al., 2003). Results revealed an interesting effect of 
introspection (i.e., attention to craving and affect) on self-control failure (as measured by a 
purchase task) that varied by restrained eating status. Restrained eaters showed more impulsive 
valuation (i.e., reported they would pay high sums of money for luxury items) when asked to 
reflect on their craving and affect; however, unrestrained eaters showed less impulsive valuation 
(i.e., were more likely to “spend” less on rated luxury items) when asked to reflect on their 
craving and affect (Veilleux, Skinner, & Pollert, 2017). These results suggest that the process of 
simply thinking about one’s emotions and desires can facilitate self-control in some, while 
harming self-control in others. The notion that introspection can facilitate self-control in 
unrestrained eaters is consistent with the mood-as-information effect (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), 
in which awareness of cravings and desires serve as a signal to engage in self-control in an 
attempt to resist the urge to eat. Consistent with the “hijack” theory of desire, introspection in 
restrained eaters appears to overwhelm self-control attempts by placing an intense focus on food 





experience conflicting goals (i.e., to approach and avoid a desire), introspecting on emotion and 
craving appears to result in an increased likelihood of self-control failure.  
In sum, it stands to reason that positive and negative emotional states can differentially 
influence the degree to which an individual is motivated to persevere in the face of temptation 
(e.g., positive urgency), and also suggests that for people at risk for addictive behaviors (e.g, 
restrained eaters, smokers), attending to one’s emotional state and desires can impair self-
control. Conversely, attending to emotion may actually facilitate self-control in others.  
Emotion, Justification and Self-Control 
While theorists suggest emotions play a role in justification and that negative mood 
influences self-control, the specific function and fluctuation of emotion in justification-based 
self-control failure has yet to be examined (De Witt Huberts et at., 2012; Evers, Stok, & De 
Ridder, 2010).   
Several options seem plausible. First, it is possible that justification itself could make 
people feel better about their choices after the fact, thereby resulting in less negative affect 
immediately following “giving in” to temptation. For example, simply telling oneself “I deserve 
to eat the cake” may be enough to curtail the resulting negative affect. The provision of a 
seemingly-rational reason to engage in a tempting behavior may be enough to prevent higher 
levels of negative affect immediately following the temptation. While this explanation is 
possible, the vignette study referred to earlier assessed mood both before and after the self-
control decision to be able to assess for changes in mood based on justification. In addition to 
assessing the effect of justification on self-control decision (whether hypothetical student 
“Taylor” would go home or to the gym), we hypothesized that justification participants would 





control participants. We asked participants to rate Taylor’s mood both before and after the 
decision. The results suggested no differences between the justification and control group’s 
mood ratings after the decision, controlling for pre-decision mood.  However, and importantly, 
participants who indicated that Taylor went home (self-control failure) rated Taylor’s post-
decision mood as more negative when compared to participants who decided that Taylor went to 
the gym (self-control success). This is evidence that self-control failure makes people feel bad, 
and suggests that the effect of justification on mood likely occurs earlier in the decision-making 
process.  
We are then left with two options: justification influences behavior before the decision or 
during the decision.  Because the temptation may be in direct discordance with the long-term 
goal, the decision to engage in a temptation may be dependent on a person’s ability to generate 
reasons for doing so. Individuals may recall past successes and experience positive emotions 
(e.g., pride), and this “mood boost” may encourage the decision to engage in the temptation to 
maintain hedonic increase. People likely feel a mix of both positive and negative emotions when 
faced with self-regulation challenge, and these emotions probably play a role in decision-making 
(Schwarz, 2000). People often struggle to make decisions when overwhelmed by emotion, 
particularly when such emotions are of high intensity (Vohs et al., 2008). In addition, the act of 
contemplation (e.g., making a choice) hinges on a person’s ability to give conscious 
consideration to a menu of choices (Vohs et al., 2008). Thus, in a moment of overwhelming 
positive emotion (“I am so proud of myself because I ate healthy this week”) may actually propel 
the individual toward the temptation.  While the previous hypothesis places justification’s effect 
on mood after the decision, this hypothesis places the emphasis before the decision, or during the 





Justification could also occur during the temptation. When engaging in justification 
during indulgence, an individual may relish the feeling of engaging in a temptation and feel as 
though they deserve it. This may be reinforcing as a result of momentary pleasure and incentive 
learning. Incentive learning theory posits that stimuli or contexts previously paired with a reward 
acquire an “incentive value,” and as result, increase behaviors associated with the obtainment of 
the reward (Balleine & Dickinson, 1991). Importantly, various emotional and motivational states 
can serve as a context for memory recall (Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). Thus, 
an individual learns that performing a particular behavior when in a specific motivational state 
(e.g., desire) leads to reward or a pleasurable experience. It may be possible for people to learn 
that specific strategies or processes (e.g., justification) allow one to simultaneously access their 
desires and feel less guilty when doing so. In addition, the overwhelming experience of positive 
emotion (as a result of recalling prior-goal consistent behavior) may result in a narrowing of 
attention (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). The tempting stimulus may appear both deserved and 
overwhelmingly pleasurable. When returned to a similar motivational or emotional state, the 
person then recalls the “successful” use of a particular process or behavior (e.g., justification) 
along with the increased momentary pleasure of indulgence, and becomes increasingly likely to 
use the process in the future. The use of justification is reinforced when the individual 
experiences the pleasure while indulging (“This cake is especially delicious because I deserve 
it”). Thus, the individual learns that employing justification results in both momentary pleasure 
and reduced negative affect during indulgence. To my knowledge, neither explanation (i.e., the 
idea that justification influences self-control before or during the temptation) has been explicitly 






The Current Studies 
The following three studies tested the role of positive affect in justification-based self-
regulation failure. In all three studies, a licensing-based justification condition was compared to a 
positive affect condition and no-affect control condition on self-reported affect and (in Studies 2 
and 3) imaginal (i.e., hypothetical) temptation decisions. The aim of Study 1 was to determine 
whether justification results in an increase in positive affect. I predicted that individuals in the 
justification condition would report an increase in positive affect after thinking about past 
healthy behaviors similar to a positive affect condition and greater than participants in a control 
condition.  
Then, the aim of Study 2 was to determine if justification increases the likelihood of 
engaging in temptation following an increase in positive affect. I predicted that people in the 
justification condition would be more likely to select an unhealthy (versus healthy) food item 
compared to people in the positive affect and control conditions. I also predicted that attention to 
emotion would moderate the effect of condition on choice, such that people who justified would 
be less likely to engage in temptation (i.e., to select an unhealthy food item) compared to 
individuals in the positive affect and control conditions.  
Finally, the aim of Study 3 was to test the alternative prediction that instead of 
influencing positive affect prior to making a self-control decision, perhaps justification 
influences food enjoyment (i.e., increase positive affect during consumption of a temptation). I 
predicted that people in the justification condition would report greater imagined enjoyment of a 
temptation compared to people in the positive affect and control conditions. I also predicted that 
people in the justification condition would report greater imagined positive affect when 






The goal of Study 1 was to assess whether recalling past successes results in increased 
positive momentary emotion.  I hypothesized that individuals in the justification condition would 
report an increase in positive affect following recall of past successes similar to individuals in the 
positive affect condition and greater than participants in the control condition.   
Participants 
 Participants were 304 adults recruited through the general psychology subject pool (n = 
152) and Amazon Mechanical Turk (n = 152) with a combined mean age of 26.62 (SD = 10.49). 
The majority of the sample identified as female (53.9%) and participants were primarily 
Caucasian (77.0%). Participants were excluded if they reported taking the survey more than once 
(n = 9), if they indicated they were not paying attention during the survey (n = 4), or if they 
responded “Yes” to a question asking if we should not keep their data (n = 25). Participants were 
also excluded if they took longer than 90 minutes to complete the study (n = 8), or if they gave 
responses to the narrative questions that were inconsistent with the prompt (e.g., writing 
“GOOD” when asked to describe a clothing item (n = 161). These exclusions left a total of 265 
participants included in the final analyses. See Table 1 for demographic information.   An 
independent samples t-test revealed that the average age of mTurk participants was higher than 
that of subject pool participants (see Table 1 for means and significance test). Additionally, a 
                                                        
1 Midway through analyses of these studies, concerns arose about the integrity of Mechanical 
Turk data, as other researchers identified data that were suggestive of ‘robot’ or ‘bot’ non-human 
responses (Bai, 2018; Ryan, 2018). Due to these concerns, we re-analyzed all of the studies using 
suggested methods, including identifying duplicate longitude and latitude responses and 
examining the quality of the responses to the narrative manipulation items.  As legitimate 
duplicate longitude and latitude responses are possible (e.g., people in the same office or home 
completing this study), we elected to examine the qualitative responses more carefully across all 
three studies, and ultimately chose to exclude participants whose narrative responses did not 





chi-square test of independence revealed a significant difference in gender based on sample, with 
a greater number of males in the mTurk sample compared to the subject pool. There were no 
differences in minority status based on sample. 
Measures 
Positive and Negative Affect.  The Scale of Positive and Negative Experience (SPANE; 
Diener et al, 2009) is a 12-item scale that measures positive and negative experience.  Items are 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (very rarely or never) to 5 (very often or always).  The 
measure is comprised of two subscales, positive experience and negative experience, both of 
which contain six items.  The two subscales can be scored separately to assess positive 
experience and negative experience independently. The original instructions were modified to 
ask participants to to rate their current emotions in the present, as opposed to over the previous 
two weeks.  In the current study, the SPANE demonstrated good reliability across both positive 
(Time 1: α = .88, Time 2: α = .90) and negative subscales (Time 1: α = .92, Time 2:  α = .93 ).  
Trait Emotional Intelligence. The Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, 
Turvey, & Palfai, 1995) is a 30-item self-report scale that measures attention to mood, clarity of 
mood, and efforts to repair negative mood states. Items are rated on a 5-point scale, ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale measures individual differences in people’s 
tendencies to attend to their moods and emotions, discriminate among them, and regulate them. 
These tendencies are thought to represent aspects of emotional intelligence. Although there are 
subscales, in the current study the overall score was used to measure total emotional intelligence. 
The scale demonstrated excellent reliability α = .90).  
Impulsivity. The Short UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale (Cyders et al., 2014) is a 20-





al., 2007). The UPPS-P is a revised version of the UPPS Impulsive Behavior scale (Whiteside & 
Lynam, 2001). The scale measures multiple aspects of impulsivity, like tendencies to engage in 
impulsive behavior when in positive or negative moods, sensation seeking behaviors, and the 
tendency to act without thinking about consequences. Although there are subscales, in the 
current study only the overall score was used to measure total impulsivity. The scale 
demonstrated good reliability (α = .86).  
Procedures 
Participants first completed the Scale of Positive and Negative Experiences (SPANE; 
Diener et al., 2010) which served as a baseline measure of positive and negative affect. Next, 
participants completed measures of emotionality and impulsivity (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995; 
UPPS; Cyders et al., 2014), both to assess individual differences and to serve as a filler between 
the initial emotion measure and the thought-listing task.  
Participants were then randomized to a justification, positive affect, or control condition 
via a thought listing task. Participants in the justification condition were provided with the 
following instructions: “In the space below, please list three healthy choices you made in the past 
week (the past 7 days). The choices can be anything health-related, including exercise, and 
healthy eating. These should be specific choices that you made in one moment in time. For 
example, Ted might say, “On Tuesday, I went to the gym for an hour and did both cardio and 
weight-lifting.” For another example, Aileen might say, “On Saturday, I ate a salad for lunch 
instead of eating a hamburger.” Participants in the positive affect condition were asked to list 
three nice things others did for them, and participants in the control condition were asked to list 
items of clothing worn during the previous week. See Appendix A for a selection of participant 





Upon completion of the thought-listing task, participants were asked to complete the 
SPANE a second time, in an effort to assess their emotional state immediately after reflecting 
upon recent healthy choices. Next, participants completed a series of demographic and response 
integrity questions. Participants were asked if they paid attention while taking the survey and if 
they completed the survey more than once. In addition, participants were asked if there were any 
additional reasons why we should not keep their data, and were given the opportunity to 
elaborate on the reason without fear of penalty. Participants were paid $0.75 for completing the 
6-minute study.  
Results  
Two 3 x 2 mixed-factorial ANOVAs were conducted with condition (justification, 
positive affect, or control) as the between-subjects factor and time (pre-task and post-task) as the 
within subject factor, and affect (positive and negative) as dependent variables.  
There was a main effect of time on positive affect, F(1, 262) = 16.88, p < .001, with 
positive affect increasing from Time 1 (M = 20.46, SD = 4.94) to Time 2 (M = 21.12, SD = 5.17) 
In addition, there was a main effect of condition on positive affect, F(2, 266) = 3.06, p = .08, 
when collapsed across time periods. However, this effect was superseded by an interaction 
between time and condition, F(2, 262) = 8.74, p = .001 (see Figure 1). Positive affect increased 
over time for individuals in both the positive affect, F(1, 83) = 11.31, p = .003, and justification,  
F(1, 82) = 15.62, p < .001 conditions; however, positive affect did not change over time for those 
in the control condition F(1, 97) = 1.09, p = .30.  
There was a main effect of time on negative affect, F(1, 262) = 13.10, p = .001, with 
negative affect decreasing from Time 1 (M = 9.49, SD = 4.42) to Time 2 (M = 8.97, SD = 4.43).  





across time periods. There was a marginally significant interaction between time and condition 
for negative affect, F(2, 262) = 2.71, p = .07. Negative affect decreased over time for individuals 
in both the positive affect, F(1, 83) = 39.05, p = .002, and justification,  F(1, 82) = 5.49, p = .02 
conditions; however, negative affect did not change over time for those in the control condition 
F(1, 97) = .27, p = .60.  
We also evaluated whether sample (i.e., subject pool versus mTurk) moderated the above 
effects by re-running the above analyses as a three-way mixed ANOVA with sample as a 
between- subjects factor. This was done in an effort to examine whether the previous results 
differed based on sample type. There were no three-way interactions between condition, time, 
and sample type for either positive affect, F(2, 259) = ..02, p = .98, or negative affect, F(2, 259) 
= 3.61, p = .30.  
Moderation analyses were conducted to examine if individual differences influenced the 
effect of condition on positive affect using the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Version 3.0; Hayes, 
2018).  Self-reported emotional intelligence and impulsivity were entered separately as 
predictors of positive affect at Time 2, with condition entered as a multi-categorical moderator 
and positive affect at Time 1 as a covariate. Greater self-reported emotional intelligence did not 
predict higher positive affect at Time 2 (B = .01, SE = .01), and did not moderate the effect of 
condition on positive affect (B = - .004, SE = .01). There was no main effect of impulsivity (B = -
.02, SE = .39), nor did impulsivity moderate the effect of condition on positive affect (B = .86, 
SE = .47).  
Discussion 
 
 Study 1 sought to examine whether recalling past successes results in increased positive 





in a small, albeit reliable, increase in positive emotion. In fact, justification influenced emotion 
similar to that of a more general, positive affect manipulation. Negative affect also decreased for 
participants in the justification and positive affect conditions, but not for control participants. 
Justification via self-licensing resulted in an increase in positive emotion similar to a more 
general, positive affect manipulation.  
Importantly, while Study 1 did show that justification via self-licensing has an uplifting 
effect on mood, it did not test whether the increase in positive affect actually influenced 
behavioral outcomes. Given past research on positive emotion and behavior (Gable & Harmon, 
2008), we would expect an increase in positive affect to exert some influence over subsequent 
behavioral decisions. A primary goal of Study 2 was to investigate whether justification resulted 
in an increased tendency to engage in temptation following an increase in positive affect.   
Study 2 
The goal of Study 2 was to assess whether justification results in an increased propensity 
to engage in temptation following an increase in positive emotion. I hypothesized that 
individuals in the justification condition would be more likely to engage in a temptation 
compared to individuals in the positive affect and control conditions. In addition, I hypothesized 
that attention to emotion would moderate the effect of condition on food choice, such that 
individuals in the justification condition who attend to their emotions will be less likely to 
engage in a temptation (i.e., select an unhealthy food item) compared to individuals in the both 
the positive affect and control conditions.   
Participants 
Participants were 330 adults recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk with a mean age 





were primarily Caucasian (63.3%). Participants were excluded if they responded “Yes” to a 
question asking if we should not keep their data (n = 4), or indicated they chose a food item 
(which served as the primary outcome variable) at random (n = 17). We also excluded 40 
participants for suspicion that their responses were not provided by a human (e.g., if they were 
identified as potentially being a robot; see Study 1 participants section), by examining qualitative 
responses and excluding any participant whose narrative responses were not reasonable answers 
to the question). These exclusions left a total of 269 participants included in the final analyses. 
Measures 
State emotion (SPANE; Diener et al., 2010), trait emotionality (TMMS; Salovey et al., 
1995), and impulsivity (SUPPS-P; Cyders et al., 2014) were assessed the same as in Study 1. In 
the current study, the SPANE demonstrated good reliability on both positive (Time 1: α = .94, 
Time 2: α = .94) and negative subscales (Time 1: α = .97, Time 2:  α = .97). Relatedly, both the 
TMMS (α = .90) and SUPPS-P (α = .87) demonstrated good reliability.  
Restrained eating. Participants also completed the Revised Restraint Scale (RRS; 
Herman & Polivy, 1980) in an effort to determine if restrained eating status influenced the 
relationship between justification and self-control failure. The RRS is a 10-item measure of 
restrained eating behaviors (e.g., altering or limiting eating behavior as a result of image or 
weight perception). Participants respond to each item on scale of 0 (never) to 10 (always). Scores 
are then summed, and range from 0 to 40 with higher scores indicating restrained eating 
behavior. Unrestrained eaters are classified as males with scores of 12 or above and females with 








Participants first completed the Scale of Positive and Negative Experiences (SPANE; 
Diener et al., 2010) which served as a baseline measure of positive and negative affect. Next, 
participants completed measures of emotionality and impulsivity (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995; 
SUPPS; Cyders et al., 2014), both to assess individual differences and to serve as a filler between 
the initial emotion measure and the thought-listing task.  
Participants were then randomized via the same method used in Study 1. Participants in 
the justification condition were asked to list three healthy choices they made in the past week 
(the past 7 days), participants in the positive affect condition were asked to list three nice things 
others did for them, and participants in the control condition were asked to list items of clothing 
worn during the previous week. Upon completion of the thought-listing task, half of the 
participants were asked to complete the SPANE a second time, which was designed to 1) assess 
their emotional state immediately after reflecting upon recent healthy choices, and 2) serve as a 
manipulation of attention to emotion.  
Participants were then given the following instructions, “Imagine that you are 
hungry right now. On the next page, please select the food item that appears most appetizing, and 
that you would most like to eat.” They then viewed six food images, where choices included 
three healthy (strawberries, snack mix, roasted potatoes) and unhealthy (chocolate cake, French 
fries, lasagna) food items, which were selected to represent sweet, salty, and savory options, 
respectively. The pictures of foods were selected from the food-pics database (Blechert, Meule, 
Busch, & Ohla, 2014). Food items from the same flavor profiles (e.g., salty, savory) were 
selected, and foods within domain (healthy, unhealthy) were matched in terms of fat contact and 





Following the food selection, participants completed a series of questions designed to 
assess the desirability of each food item (“How desirable is this food right now?” and “How 
appetizing does this food look?”). Participants were also asked the degree to which they believed 
they deserved to eat the chosen item (“How much do you deserve to eat this food?”). 
Desirability, appeal, and perceived deservingness were measured on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 
100 (extremely). Participants also indicated how likely they are to consume each food item in 
everyday life (daily, weekly, monthly, rarely, never), and indicated if they were allergic to a 
number of common foods (e.g., milk/dairy, gluten, peanuts), or if they abstain from consuming 
any food item for personal or religious reasons. Next, participants completed the Revised 
Restraint Scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980), and rated each presented food item as healthy or 
unhealthy.  Finally, participants completed a series of demographic and response integrity 
questions. Participants were asked if they paid attention while taking the survey and if they 
completed the survey more than once. In addition, participants were asked if there were any 
additional reasons why we should not keep their data, and were given the opportunity to 
elaborate on the reason without fear of penalty. Participants were paid $1.50 for completing the 
11-minute study.   
Results  
Food Selection Decision. Participants were asked to select one food they wanted to eat 
from a set of three healthy (strawberries, snack mix, potatoes) and three unhealthy (chocolate 
cake, French fries, lasagna) foods items. See Appendix B for food selection percentages by item. 
For analytic purposes, healthy items were coded as “0” and unhealthy items were coded as “1.” 
Due to concerns that participants with food allergies and/or restrictions might select particular 





foods for religious or personal reasons. We classified participants (n = 43) as “food restricted” if 
they indicated they are either allergic to or unwilling to eat milk, eggs, peanuts, wheat, or “other” 
foods (i.e., not one of the options given), as these are the allergies or food preferences that would 
be most applicable to the foods depicted. A chi-square analysis was conducted to determine if 
food choice (coded dichotomously as healthy or unhealthy) differed by food restriction status. 
Results revealed no effect of food restriction on food choice, X2 (1, N = 269) = 2.62, p = .13. 
Thus, we decided to include participants with food allergies and/or restrictions in the subsequent 
analyses.  
Main Predictions.  
Replicating Study 1.  To replicate the findings from Study 1 (that justification increased 
PA similarly to a positive affect condition), we conducted two 3 x 2 mixed-factorial ANOVAs 
were conducted with condition (justification, positive affect, or control) as the between subjects 
factor and time (pre-task and post-task) as the within subject factor, and affect (positive and 
negative) as dependent variables. This analysis was conducted on about half of the participants, 
as only half of the participants (i.e., those in the ‘attention to emotion’ condition, n = 122) 
completed the SPANE again at Time 2. 
There was a main effect of time on positive affect, F(1, 144) = 9.62, p = .002, with 
positive affect increasing from Time 1 (M = 19.21, SD = 6.77) to Time 2 (M = 20.10, SD = 6.78). 
There was no main effect of condition on positive affect, F(2, 144) = 2.46, p = .08, when 
collapsed across time periods. However, there was an interaction between time and condition, 
F(2, 144) = 5.17, p = .007 (see Figure 2). Positive affect increased over time for individuals in 
the positive affect condition F(1, 48) = , p < .001; however, positive affect did not increase over 





.02, p = .89. These results did not replicate those found in Study 1, as justification did not 
increase positive affect from Time 1 to Time 2.  
There was a main effect of time on negative affect, F(1, 144) = 4.89, p = .03, with 
negative affect decreasing from Time 1 (M = 9.05, SD = 5.05) to Time 2 (M = 8.60, SD = 5.58). 
There was no main effect of condition on negative affect, F(2, 144) = 1.99, p = .14. There was no 
interaction between time and condition, F(2, 144) = .89, p = .41. These results are inconsistent 
with those found in Study 1.  
Food Choice. Overall, 53.2% of participants chose an unhealthy option. A chi-square 
analysis was conducted with condition as the independent variable and food choice (coded 
dichotomously as healthy or unhealthy) as the dependent variable. Results indicated food choice 
differed by condition, X2 (2, N = 269) = 6.18, p = .04. Fewer participants in the justification 
condition (43.2%) selected an unhealthy food item compared to participants in either the positive 
affect (61.9%) or the control (54.6%) conditions. 
Because justification did not increase the likelihood of selecting an unhealthy food item 
(i.e., a temptation), nor was justification associated with increased PA, we did not test the 
hypothesis that positive affect was the reason for justification-based self-control failure.  
Effect of Justification and Attention to Emotion on Food Choice. To examine whether 
attention to emotion influenced the rates of healthy vs. unhealthy food choice following 
justification, we conducted a log-linear analysis. Results of the log-linear analysis suggested that 
the emotion condition did not statistically moderate the results (i.e., there was no three-way 
interaction between attention to emotion condition, justification condition and food choice).  To 
determine whether attention to emotion influenced the relationship between condition and food 





condition using exploratory chi-square analyses. Results revealed no significant relationship 
between condition and food choice for those in both the attention to emotion X2 (2, N = 147) = 
2.17, p = .34, though there was a marginally significant effect for the no attention to emotion 
conditions, X2 (2, N = 122) = 5.15, p = .08. To understand the quality of the marginal effect, we 
then conducted a topographical analysis to understand patterns of food choices across condition.  
 For those who attended to emotion, 46.2% of people in the justification condition chose an 
unhealthy food item, whereas this was 40.8% for the people who did not attend to emotion. Thus, 
attention to emotion appeared to hinder, rather than facilitate, self-control. The opposite pattern 
emerged for participants in both the control and positive affect conditions. 50.8% of control 
condition participants in the attention to emotion condition selected an unhealthy food item, and 
60.5% of control condition participants who did not attend to emotion chose an unhealthy item. 
Similarly, 61.2% of positive affect condition participants who attended to emotion chose an 
unhealthy food item, while 62.9% of positive affect condition participants in the no attention to 
emotion chose an unhealthy food item. See Figure 3 for breakdown of food choice by 
justification and emotion conditions.     
 Secondary Analyses. Secondary analyses were conducted to determine if the 
desirability, deservingness, or appearance of the food items influenced participant’s food 
choices. When thinking about why justification may influence food choice, we wondered if 
participant’s desire for the foods and how much they perceived they “deserved” the foods might 
have influenced their decision. Additionally, we were interested in examining whether the 
appearance of the food items could have influenced their decision (i.e., the degree to which 
participants found the food pictures appetizing). For each of the three food enjoyment variables 





rating of the other 5 (i.e., non-chosen) foods and examined if these differed by justification 
condition using 3 (between subjects condition: justification, positive affect, control) x 2 (within 
subject: chosen food versus average of non-chosen foods) mixed ANOVAs.  
With regard to desirability, there was no overall main effect of condition F(2, 266) = .50, 
p = .61. There was no main effect of food choice (chosen vs. non-chosen) on desirability F(1, 
266) = .002, p = .96.  The interaction between chosen vs. non-chosen foods and condition was 
marginally significant, F(2, 266) = 3.04, p = .05. We conducted exploratory analyses to 
investigate the marginal interactions, as there is limited research regarding the effect of 
justification on emotion and self-control outcomes. Simple effects tests using the Bonferroni 
correction examining chosen versus non-chosen foods for each condition revealed no significant 
differences between desirability ratings for chosen and non-chosen foods for participants in the 
control condition, F(1, 96) = .000, p = .99. However, differences between ratings of chosen and 
non-chosen foods for participants in both the positive affect, F(1, 83), = 2.86, p = .09, and 
justification conditions, F(1, 87), = 3.34, p = .07, were marginally significant, such that chosen 
foods were rated as marginally less desirable for those in the positive affect condition, but 
marginally more desirable for those in the justification condition, compared to non-chosen foods. 
See Table 2 for desirability means of chosen and non-chosen foods by condition.  
 For deservingness, there was no main effect of condition, F(2, 266) = .81, p = .45 or food 
choice (chosen vs. non-chosen), F(1, 266) = .02, p = .90. Similarly, the interaction between 
chosen vs. non-chosen foods and condition on deservingness was marginally significant, F(2, 
266) = 2.96, p = .05. Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction revealed no 
significant differences between desirability ratings for chosen and non-chosen foods for 





2.72, p = .10. Chosen foods were rated with marginally higher deservingness compared to non-
chosen foods for participants in the justification condition, F(1, 87), = 3.31, p = .07.  See Table 2 
for deservingness means of chosen and non-chosen foods by condition.  
 For the outcome of food appeal, there was no main effect of condition, F(2, 266) = 1.44, 
p = .24 or food choice F(1, 266) = .12, p = .73. There was also no interaction between chosen vs. 
Non-chosen foods and condition on appeal, F(2, 266) = 1.60, p = .20.  
Effects of Individual Differences on Food Choice.  
To examine if individual differences influenced the effect of condition on food choice, 
moderated logistic regression analyses were conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 20132). Restrained eating and impulsivity were entered into separate models as 
predictors of food choice, and dummy coded condition variables were entered as moderators 
(Justification vs Control, PA vs Control, with Control as the reference variable). Variables were 
mean-centered prior to analyses.  
 Restrained eating did not predict food choice, B = -.02, SE = .03, p = .44.  In addition, 
there were no differences between the justification and control condition in terms of the effect of 
restrained eating on food choice, B = -.01, SE = .05, p = .79.  There were also no differences 
between the positive affect and control condition in terms of the effect of restrained eating on 
food choice, B = .05, SE = .05, p = .32.   
In the impulsivity analysis, impulsivity did not predict food choice, B = .37, SE = .27, p = 
.17. There were no differences between the justification and control condition in terms of the 
effect of impulsivity on food choice, B = -.11, SE = .68, p = .87. There were also no differences 
                                                        
2 Study 2 analyses required the use of PROCESS 2.0 due to a categorical outcome variable; 





between the positive affect and control condition in terms of the effect of impulsivity on food 
choice, B = .51, SE = .66, p = .44.  
Discussion 
 Study 2 sought to examine whether justification increases the likelihood that one will 
engage in temptation following an increase in positive emotion. While justification did increase 
positive emotion in Study 1, these results were not replicated in Study 2. In this study, positive 
affect increased over time only for those in positive affect, but not the justification or control 
conditions. Findings related to negative affect were also inconsistent across the two studies. We 
found an overall increase of negative affect across time in both studies, but an interaction 
between time and condition only in Study 1.  
Justification (via a self-licensing manipulation) does not appear to consistently result in 
increased positive affect. Several explanations for this finding seem plausible. The justification 
manipulation may not be specific enough to truly elicit the justification process. Participants 
were asked to recall recent healthy choices (in general), but were asked to make an imagined, 
domain-specific (i.e., food) choice. It is unclear whether justification works differently when 
previous behavior and the self-control dilemma are across- or within-domains. In other words, 
justification may only work if one recalls past behavior that is closely related to a potential 
temptation. Second, there could be differences in sample composition across studies. Although 
sample differences did not influence the results in Study 1, there may be important demographic 
between participants in Studies 1 and 2. People may have differed across a number of relevant 
domains, including gender, affective tendencies, and tendency to engage in socially desirable 





explanation for our findings: justification and self-licensing are not the same. These possibilities, 
in addition to more alternative explanations, will be discussed in greater detail below.  
A second aim of Study 2 was to determine if engaging in justification (via a self-licensing 
manipulation), would result in an increased likelihood of selecting a tempting (i.e., unhealthy) 
food item. While food choice did differ by condition, the results were not in the expected 
direction. Participants in the justification were more likely to select a healthy, rather than an 
unhealthy, food item compared to individuals in the positive affect and control conditions. This 
result contradicts previous findings, which suggest justification facilitates self-control failure 
(Hill & Veilleux, in preparation). Thinking about past healthy choices seemed to prime 
participants to make healthy choices, instead of propelling them toward temptation. Replication 
will be needed to determine whether recall of past healthy behavior (i.e., licensing) serves a 
priming, rather than justification, function.  
Importantly, the designation of healthy versus unhealthy food items was determined by 
the food-pics database, and may not accurately reflect participant’s perceptions of healthy versus 
unhealthy foods. For example, participants may have considered strawberries as an unhealthy 
(i.e., tempting) food item despite our decision to code them as healthy. If a participant chose 
strawberries, they may have actually given in to temptation; however, our coding would have 
incorrectly classified them as having successfully resisted a temptation.  It may be important to 
actually test the classification of these foods as healthy versus unhealthy rather than assuming 
based on database information. 
We predicted justification would license participants to give in to temptation because of 
an increase in positive affect. Thinking about past healthy choices did not result in an increase in 





findings, we did not investigate the hypothesis that positive affect was the reason for 
justification-based self-control failure.  
Additionally, we predicted that attention to emotion would facilitate self-control, such 
that individuals in the justification condition who attended to their emotions would be less likely 
to select an unhealthy food item (i.e., to resist temptation). Thinking about past healthy choices 
did influence participants’ food choices, but not in the way we expected, as thinking about past 
healthy choices helped participants make current healthier choices. Instead of pushing them 
closer to their temptations, our manipulation appeared to prime participants to “think healthy.” 
Because participants who thought about past healthy choices were already more likely to choose 
a healthy food, attending to their emotions did not seem to play much of a role in their self-
control decision. Attention emotions appeared to attenuate participants’ “gut instincts,” (i.e., to 
choose a tempting food), as opposed to exerting a measurable influence over their food choices.   
What remains unclear is whether thinking about past healthy choices truly helped participants to 
resist their temptations, or if the act of recalling previous healthy behavior (i.e., priming) played 
a primary role in facilitating participants’ subsequent healthy choices.  
We also hypothesized that restrained eating and/or impulsivity might moderate the 
relationship between condition and food choice; however, results revealed neither restrained 
eating, nor impulsivity, influenced this relationship. This may be because the imaginal self-
control challenge was not strong enough to evoke a true self-control dilemma, or because these 
individual differences (impulsivity, restrained eating), may influence the justification, but not 
priming, process.  
Overall, there were no differences in desirability, perceived deservingness, and appeal 





on measures of desirability and deservingness were marginally significant for participants in the 
justification condition. This suggests participants in the justification condition (who thought 
about past healthy behavior) may have considered their chosen food item as more desirable than 
the foods they did not select. Similarly, participants in the justification condition indicated they 
deserved their chosen food item more than the food items they did not select.  Interestingly, these 
food ratings occurred after the participant food choice, suggesting participants in the justification 
condition may have experienced cognitive dissonance regarding their temptations. Specifically, 
participants may have chosen a healthier, less tempting food item in an attempt to stay consistent 
with their previous behavior. As a result, their food enjoyment ratings may have fallen in line 
with their behavior, rather than their desires. Alternatively, the priming effect may have inspired 
participants to make healthier choices instead of “giving in” to temptation. Participant ratings of 
the chosen food item may have been bolstered by the fact that they genuinely felt good about 
their decisions (i.e., their ability to engage in effective self-control) and the resulting food choice.  
Earlier, I discussed two potential explanation for the role of positive affect in 
justification-based self-control failure: justification influences behavior before the decision (i.e., 
due to a preceding increase in positive affect) or during the decision (i.e., due to changes in 
positive affect during temptation). These results suggest justification may influence positive 
affect, but at a different point in the justification process. Specifically, justification may result in 
an increase in positive affect at the time of indulgence, instead of before. In other words, 
justification may increase the likelihood of “giving in” by increasing the positive emotion 
associated with a temptation. Justification may also lead to a more pleasurable and satisfying 
“temptation” experience, and thereby increase the likelihood one will engage in justification in 





engaging in temptation, and may remove negative emotions (e.g., guilt) often associated with 
“giving in.” Thus, the primary goals of Study 3 will be to investigate whether justification results 
in increased enjoyment (i.e., “Does justification increase how good a food tastes?”) and pleasure 
during food consumption (i.e., “Does justification increase how good one feels while engaging in 
a temptation?”). 
Study 3 
The goal of Study 3 was to determine the effect of justification on food enjoyment. I 
predicted that individuals in the justification condition would experience increased imagined 
enjoyment of a temptation compared to individuals in both positive affect and control conditions. 
In addition, I predicted that individuals in the justification condition would experience greater 
imagined positive affect while consuming an unhealthy (i.e., tempting) food item.   
Participants 
 
Participants were 346 adults recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk with a mean age 
of 34.28 (SD = 11.17). The majority of the sample identified as female (50.6%) and participants 
were primarily Caucasian (74.0%). Participants were excluded if they responded “Yes” to a 
question asking if we should not keep their data (n = 7), or if they reported they chose a food 
item (which served as the primary outcome variable) at random (n = 21). We also excluded 39 
participants for suspicion that their responses were not provided by a human (e.g., if they were 
identified as potentially being a robot), using the same method described earlier. This left a total 
of 278 participants included in the final analyses. 
Measures 
Baseline state emotion (SPANE; Diener et al., 2010), trait emotionality (TMMS; Salovey 





Cyders et al., 2014) were assessed the same as in the prior studies. In the current study, the 
SPANE demonstrated good reliability across both positive (Time 1: α = .93, Time 2: α = .88) and 
negative subscales (Time 1: α = .95, Time 2:  α = .96). Relatedly, the TMMS and UPPS-P 
demonstrated good and excellent reliability (α = .91; α = .86), respectively. The RRS 
demonstrated good reliability (α = .81).  
Procedure  
Participants first completed the Scale of Positive and Negative Experiences (SPANE; 
Diener et al., 2010) which served as a baseline measure of positive and negative affect. Next, 
participants completed measures of emotionality and impulsivity (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995; 
SUPPS-P; Cyders et al., 2014), both to assess individual differences and to serve as a filler 
between the initial emotion measure and the thought-listing task.  
Participants were then randomized to a justification, positive affect, or control condition 
via the same thought listing task used in Studies 1 and 2, with a slight amendment in the 
instructions to encourage more detailed responses.  For example, participants in the justification 
condition were provided with the following instructions: “In the space below, please list three 
healthy choices you made in the past week (the past 7 days). The choices can be anything health-
related, including exercise, and healthy eating. These should be specific choices that you made in 
one moment in time. The idea is to be detailed and specific; write a short paragraph. For 
example, Ted might say, “Yesterday, I went to the gym for an hour and did both cardio and 
weight-lifting. I ran on the treadmill for 30 minutes and watched Judge Judy, and I pushed 
myself to run faster than usual so I was really tired at the end. I also lifted and made a personal 
best.” Of note, the control condition prompt to describe three items of clothing worn in the last 





control condition did not engage in any recall task, we felt it was acceptable to retain this as a 
control condition, albeit a slightly different control condition than in the prior studies.  
Participants were then given the same instructions as Study 2, “Imagine that you are 
hungry right now. On the next page, please select the food item that appears most appetizing, and 
that you would most like to eat.” The food choices were the same as those presented in Study 2, 
with three healthy (strawberries, snack mix, roasted potatoes) and three unhealthy (chocolate 
cake, French fries, lasagna) food items. Following the selection, participants completed a series 
of food ratings assessing the imagined taste, smell, and appearance of the selected food item (“If 
this food was in front of you right now, how much would you enjoy the taste/smell/appearance 
of the food”), on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very much).  Next, they completed an 
amended version of the SPANE, designed to assess their imagined emotional state while 
consuming the food they selected (“Please imagine you are eating the food you selected. Rate the 
degree to which you would imagine experiencing the following emotions while eating the 
food”). This version of the SPANE also included two items “hungry” and “full” to assess their 
level of hunger. Participants then selected reasons for their food choice (“It was the food I desire 
the most,” “It was my favorite food”). This was done both in an effort to determine if 
participants should be excluded based on a random food choice, and to gain an understanding of 
factors driving their food selection decision.  
Next, participants completed the Revised Restraint Scale (Herman & Polivy, 1980) and a 
series of dieting questions in an effort to assess restrained eating behavior. To ensure we 
categorized the food items appropriately, participants also rated each of the six food items as 
either healthy or unhealthy. Participants also indicated if they were allergic to a number of 





item for personal or religious reasons. Finally, participants completed a series of demographic 
and response integrity questions. Participants were asked if they paid attention while taking the 
survey and if they completed the survey more than once. In addition, participants were asked if 
there were any additional reasons why we should not keep their data, and were given the 
opportunity to elaborate on the reason without fear of penalty. Participants were paid $1.20 for 
completing the 8-minute study.   
Results  
 Replicating Study 2. Overall, 57.2% of participants chose an unhealthy option. To 
replicate the findings from Study 2, a chi-square analysis was conducted with condition as the 
independent variable and food choice (coded dichotomously as healthy or unhealthy) as the 
dependent variable. Results indicated food choice differed by condition, X2 (2, N = 278 = 9.06, p 
= .01; more participants in the control condition selected an unhealthy food item (50.5%).  
compared to participants in the positive affect (46.3%) and justification (29.3%) conditions. 
Main Predictions.  
Imagined Food Enjoyment and Deservingness. Because all three food enjoyment 
variables (taste, smell, appearance) were highly correlated (r > .50) we averaged the three 
variables to create an average food enjoyment score (α = .82). See Table 3 for correlations 
among food enjoyment variables.  We then evaluated effects of condition and food choice 
category (healthy or unhealthy) on imagined food enjoyment using a two-way between subjects 
ANOVA. There was a main effect of condition on imagined food enjoyment, F(2, 272) = 5.55, p 
= .004. Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni correction revealed individuals in the positive 
affect (M = 84.12, SD = 16.68) and control conditions (M = 82.60, SD = 17.61) reported greater 





= 16.33). There was also a main effect of food choice category on imagined food enjoyment, 
F(1, 272) = 10.44, p = .001. Participants who selected a healthy food item reported greater levels 
of food enjoyment (M = 83.94, SD = 14.96) when compared to participants who selected an 
unhealthy food item (M = 78.71, SD = 19.19). There was no interaction between condition and 
food choice category, F(2, 272) = 0.87, p = .42.  
To examine whether food choice influenced the effect of condition on imagined 
deservingness, we conducted a second two-way ANOVA with condition and food choice 
category as the between subjects factors and imagined deservingness as the dependent variable. 
There was no main effect of condition on imagined food deservingness, F(2, 272) = 1.32, p = 
.27; however, there was a main effect of food choice on imagined deservingness, F(1, 272) = 
10.02, p = .002. Participants who selected a healthy food item reported greater deservingness (M 
= 75.29, SD = 25.05) when compared to those who selected an unhealthy food item (M = 65.5, 
SD = 30.82). There was no interaction between condition and food choice category, F(2, 272) = 
0.30, p = .74.  
Imagined Positive Affect. To examine whether condition influenced imagined positive 
affect after hypothetically selecting a chosen food item, a two-way ANCOVA was conducted 
with condition and food choice as the between subjects factors and Time 2 (imagined) positive 
affect as the dependent variable while controlling for Time 1 (initial) positive affect. There was 
no significant effect of condition, F(2, 271) = 1.49, p = .23, or food choice, F(1, 271) = 1.58, p = 
.21, nor an interaction between them F(2, 271) = 1.16, p = .31 on imagined positive affect after 
controlling for positive affect at Time 1. However, Time 1 positive affect significantly predicted 





Secondary Analyses. To verify we correctly assigned each food item to the correct 
category (healthy or unhealthy), we conducted secondary examining participant ratings of food 
items. See Table 4 for descriptive food information. The majority of participants rated 
strawberries (96.5%) and potatoes (59.8%) as healthy foods, and fries (87.3%), lasagna (73.4%), 
and chocolate cake (84.1%) as unhealthy. The only controversial food item was the snack mix, 
which we classified as a healthy food item. Only 51.2% of participants designated it as a healthy, 
rather than unhealthy, food item. Overall, the food choices appeared to match their designated 
category with respect to healthy versus unhealthy items.  
Effects of Individual Differences on Food Choice.  
To examine if individual differences influenced the effect of condition on food choice, 
moderated logistic regression analyses were conducted using the PROCESS macro for SPSS 
(Hayes, 2013). Restrained eating and impulsivity were entered into separate models as predictors 
of food choice, and dummy coded condition variables were entered as moderators (Justification 
vs Control, PA vs Control, with Control as the reference variable). Variables were mean-centered 
prior to analyses.  
 Restrained eating did not predict food choice, B = -.01, SE = .04, p = .81. There were no 
differences between the positive affect and control condition in terms of the effect of restrained 
eating on food choice, B = -.19, SE = .29, p = .51.  Relatedly, there were no differences between 
the justification and control condition in terms of the effect of restrained eating on food choice, B 
= -.03, SE = .05, p = .50.  
In the impulsivity analysis, impulsivity did not predict food choice, B = .33, SE = .27, p = 
.21. There were no differences between the positive affect and control condition in terms of the 





between the justification and control condition in terms of the effect of impulsivity on food 
choice, B = 1.38, SE = .69, p = .04. The effect of impulsivity on food choice was marginally 
significant for those in the justification condition, B = .96, SE = .56, p = .08.  
Discussion  
A primary goal of Study 3 was to determine if justification increased pleasure during 
imaginal food consumption (i.e., pleasure associated with “giving in” to a temptation). In 
addition, we wanted to investigate whether justification (via a self-licensing manipulation) would 
result in greater imagined positive affect while hypothetically consuming an unhealthy food 
item.  
Although we found a main effect of condition on food choice, the pattern was consistent 
with findings from Study 2 rather than with initial predictions. Participants were more likely to 
choose a healthy, rather than unhealthy, food item. This finding supports our suspicion that we 
have activated a priming, rather than justification, process. In addition, those in the justification 
condition (via a self-licensing manipulation) did not report increased enjoyment of food, and this 
was true regardless of whether a participant “failed” at self-control (i.e., chose an unhealthy 
food) or successfully resisted temptation (i.e., chose a healthy food).  
It is important to note participants made all food-related ratings (e.g., enjoyment, 
deservingness) after the hypothetical food choice task. Participants were asked to evaluate their 
chosen food item (as well as the non-selected food items) after they had already made a decision. 
As a result, participants may have felt the need to rationalize their decision (i.e., to rate their 
chosen food as more enjoyable and desirable) in attempt to reduce dissonance associated with 
their selection.  This explanation may be most plausible for those who chose a healthy food item 





indulgent, more tempting item), and their goal (i.e., to make healthy decisions), may have 
influenced their food enjoyment ratings. Additionally, the finding that justification does not 
increase enjoyment of food may also be explained by the high reward value often associated with 
food. Justification may have added little value because participants already found the foods 
enjoyable overall. These explanations are discussed in greater detail below.  
General Discussion 
The current set of studies had four primary aims. First, we were interested in finding out 
whether justification change emotion. We believed that justification, via a self-licensing 
manipulation, would increase positive affect, and decrease negative affect. Second, we believed 
justification would result in an increased likelihood of self-control failure. We predicted 
participants who engaged in justification would be more likely to select a tempting (unhealthy) 
food item. Relatedly, we hypothesized that justification would increase self-control failure by 
way of positive affect. Stated differently, justification should propel people to choose an 
unhealthy temptation because they experience an increase in positive affect. Studies 1 and 2 
were designed to investigate whether justification results in self-control failure before the 
decision. Study 3 examined an alternative explanation: the idea that justification occurs during 
the temptation or self-control decision (i.e., people relish the feeling of engaging in the 
temptation and feel they deserve it). In Study 3, we attempted to find out whether engaging in 
justification increases the pleasure and enjoyment during temptation.    
The Link Between Justification and Positive Affect 
In Study 1, positive affect increased for participants in both the justification and positive 
affect conditions; however, these results were not replicated in Study 2. Both conditions were 





(i.e., the justification condition; self-licensing), or positive experiences they had with others (i.e., 
the positive affect condition). Thus, while the results of Study 1 might suggest that justification 
does make people feel good, it is unclear whether this was a result of a “pure” justification 
process, or simply because people felt better when recalling positive memories of any sort. The 
fact that we did not find a consistent increase in positive affect across studies is inconsistent with 
prior work, which suggest people feel better when recalling positive memories (Joorman & 
Siemer, 2004), and when they engage in self- or moral-licensing (Merritt & Monin, 2010). A few 
explanations for these inconsistencies seem plausible. First, the justification manipulation may 
simply be inconsistent. Thinking about past healthy behaviors may be more important for some 
than others, and thereby influences positive affect differentially depending on the individual. 
While we controlled for sample type in Study 1, there may be individual characteristics that 
influenced the results across studies. For example, participants in Study 1 were higher in trait 
impulsivity compared to participants in Study 2. Study 1 participants were also higher in positive 
urgency, a specific facet of impulsivity which measures the tendency to act rashly in response to 
positive affective states. Thus, relevant individual differences (e.g., impulsivity, emotional 
reactivity), may explain the inconsistent emotion results across our studies. In addition, the key 
to justification’s “success” may not be explicitly tied to emotion. Prior work suggests that self-
control failure increases negative affect, but that justification does not ameliorate this heightened 
distress (Hill & Veilleux, in preparation); the act of justification may facilitate self-control failure 
via another route (e.g. moral credentials; Monin & Miller, 2001).  
Justification vs. Self-Licensing: Are They Distinct Processes? 
Moral self-licensing (Monin & Miller, 2009) occurs when people provide themselves 





altruistic or “good” behavior, and feel they have earned the right to engage in negative, 
prejudicial, or immoral behavior (Jordan, Mullen, & Murnighan, 2009; Merritt, Effron, & 
Monin, 2010).  The general idea is that people think about good things they have done in an 
effort to license subsequent bad behavior. Notably, research on self-licensing does not place an 
emphasis on temporality; in fact, people can “license” their way into temptation hours, or even 
days, after their good behavior (Merritt, Fein, & Savitsky, 2009). Justification, on the other hand, 
occurs when people make excuses for discrepant behavior before they engage in a temptation. 
Researchers note that an actual self-control dilemma (i.e., to eat the cake or resist temptation) 
must be present in order to activate the justification process (De Witt Huberts et al., 2014). While 
two of our studies presented participants with a self-control dilemma (i.e., choose between a 
healthy or unhealthy food), they were unaware they would be faced with a self-control situation 
before they engaged in justification. In retrospect, we realized these study paradigms may have 
been more analogous to self-licensing than justification. In our previous vignette study (Hill & 
Veilleux, in preparation), we found that justification increased the likelihood of self-control 
failure; however, participants in this study read a story in which a character “Taylor” justified 
their behavior at the time of the self-control decision. Because participants were unaware a 
behavioral choice was on the horizon, an argument could be made that the current studies did not 
actually model justification (i.e., a specific type of self-licensing). The function of justification is 
more specific, to permit discordant behavior in specific, temporally pressing, and tempting 
situations, rather than the broad functions of self-licensing, which may permit one to act badly in 
general across a variety of non-specific situations.   
Temptations are often defined as activities, behaviors, or entities that people want to 





context of a conflicting or contradictory long-term goal (e.g., to lose weight, to be more active). 
These temptations are often viewed as luring people away from their long-term goals with the 
promise of immediate pleasure or indulgence. By this definition, temptations can also be thought 
of as short-term, hedonic-focused goals. Goals to avoid (e.g., abstain from alcohol) often conflict 
with approach-motivated temptations (e.g., to consume alcohol). This is different than the type of 
conflict presented in the current studies where participants were asked to choose between two 
approach behaviors (i.e., choose healthy foods or choose unhealthy foods); in both cases, 
participants “got” a reward. Self-control dilemmas can also challenge people to resist the 
temptation to avoid (e.g., to procrastinate) in the pursuit of an approach-oriented goal (e.g., 
complete a challenging homework assignment). Justification may operate differently depending 
on the type of self-control conflict experienced (i.e., approach/approach versus approach/avoid). 
These distinctions have important implications for the current studies. First, it may be that 
justification works better (or differently) when people are faced with a choice to engage in a 
temptation versus when they are presented with the choice to do nothing. This type of self-
control challenge is inherently different from a self-control dilemma involving a choice between 
two things (i.e., the choice between cake or an apple). Second, justification may function 
differently depending on the type of temptation. For some, a temptation to avoid (i.e., to 
procrastinate or avoid working on an assignment), may be harder to resist than an approach-
oriented temptation (i.e., to resist eating chocolate cake).  Justification may operate differently 
depending on the type of self-control conflict experienced (i.e., approach/approach versus 
approach/avoid) and the nature of the temptations (i.e., the temptation to approach or the 





Self-control conflicts require a person holds at least some desire to reach a long-term goal 
(Fujita, 2011; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). To illustrate, let us assume Ted has a goal to 
eat healthy and lose weight. Ted may be diligently watching his caloric intake, and trying his 
best to abstain from unhealthy foods like chocolate and cake. Let us also imagine that Ted is 
attending a party for a colleague, and is presented with the option to have a slice of chocolate 
cake. Ted can choose to indulge, or he can attempt to resist the cake in an effort to preserve 
toward his long-term goal. Inherent in this self-control dilemma is the idea that Ted possessing a 
goal to better his healthy, and is thereby motivated to resist temptations that may get in the way 
of his goal. Without Ted’s goal to eat healthy and lose weight, the cake no longer becomes a 
temptation. In the current studies, it is unclear whether people actually had a goal to eat healthy, 
and this makes it difficult to determine whether the food choice task represented an actual self-
control dilemma. Prior work highlights the importance of individual goals and the role they play 
in self-control situations (Fujita, 2011).  Although most people report having health related goals 
(Veilleux et al., 2018), we cannot be certain that our food choice task presented a salient 
dilemma to necessitate justification.   
We attempted to elicit the justification process, instead of allowing the process to occur 
organically. Although certainly possible, is not yet clear how one might capture the process of 
justification spontaneously (i.e., without using some kind of experimental manipulation). Asking 
participants to recall recent healthy behaviors (i.e., a licensing manipulation) in studies 2 and 3 
appeared to prime healthy choices, instead of steering participants toward temptation. Asking 
people to reflect upon healthy behavior before choosing between a healthy or unhealthy food has 
been shown to inadvertently prime healthy behavior (Wilcox, et al., 2009). While the use of 





Mukhopadhyay & Johar, 2009), future studies should attempt to activate the justification process 
in less suggestive ways in an effort to: 1) avoid potential priming effects, and 2) activate the 
justification process in ways that are ecologically valid.  Relatedly, we asked participants in the 
justification condition to recall recent healthy behaviors in general. We did not, however, ask 
them to specifically recall healthy food choices. Previous research suggests licensing may be 
most relevant when the recalled behavior matches the temptation (i.e., both related to food); 
however, others suggest licensing can also occur across domains (Effron et al., 2009; Mazar & 
Zhong, 2010).  
Justification and Enjoyment 
In Study 3, we predicted justification would allow for a more pleasurable temptation 
experience; however, results suggest justification does not result in increased pleasure or 
enjoyment in temptation. In fact, participants in the positive affect condition reported the highest 
levels of enjoyment overall. In addition, participants who selected a healthy food item reported 
greater levels of imagined enjoyment when compared to those who selected an unhealthy food. 
This appears counterintuitive, as one would expect temptations or indulgences to elicit greater 
pleasure or enjoyment when compared to healthier, less indulgent foods. Relatedly, participants 
who chose a healthy food item also reported feeling as though they deserved their food more 
than those who choose an unhealthy food item. Because participants completed their food ratings 
after they selected a food item, they may have felt compelled to rate the chosen item as more 
pleasurable than they actually believed. This hypothesis is consistent with theories of cognitive 
dissonance, which is based on the idea that people desire to maintain internal consistency 
(Festinger, 1957). When a person engages in a behavior that is seemingly inconsistent with their 





healthy item despite a strong desire to choose a temptation), they often alter their beliefs to 
alleviate discomfort. People often change their beliefs to fit their actions, and participants’ 
ratings of enjoyment and deservingness were likely influenced by their food choice. Thus, while 
the participants who chose a healthy item reported more imagined enjoyment, they may have 
actually “fit” their ratings to fall in line with their actions after the fact.  
Strengths and Limitations 
Recent work suggests that while hypothetical study paradigms are helpful experimental 
tools, participants often “act” differently in real versus imagined scenarios (Bostyn, Sevenhant, 
& Roets, 2018). A limitation of the current set of studies is the use of a hypothetical behavioral 
outcome. Participants may have selected a different food item had they known they may actually 
have been able to consume it. Further, imagined or hypothetical scenarios often lack the sensorial 
qualities (e.g., taste, smell) which often evoke emotion in real life situations. The use of a 
hypothetical self-control dilemma may have failed to bring forth a number of emotional elements 
inherent in real self-control challenges, and this may have impacted a number of aspects of the 
study. Relatedly, we may not have actually enacted a justification-based process since 
participants were not first faced with a self-control dilemma. Because we asked people to justify 
before encountering a temptation, we may not have captured the justification process as it occurs 
in real life. Future work should investigate whether timing matters for justification, and if so, if 
the timing is what distinguishes justification from similar processes (e.g., moral licensing). 
Finally, we exercised a great deal of control over the temptations in the studies. People often 
report experiencing a wide range of temptations (Veilleux et al., 2018). The food items were 
predetermined by the researchers, thereby removing the ability for the participant to 





 The current set of studies has several strengths, including large sample sizes, and the use 
of both student and general populations. To our knowledge, few studies to data have examined 
justification via an experimental manipulation, and the current studies represent one of the first 
attempts to examine justification and self-licensing through an empirical lens (Prinsen, Evers, 
Winjngaards, van Vliet, and de Ridder, 2018). While concerns regarding constrained temptation 
selection and the use of a hypothetical behavior choice are valid, they could also be considered 
strengths, as they allow researchers to exert control over goal motivation and an immediate self-
control decision.  While asking participants to make hypothetical decisions may seem artificial or 
contrived, it may also allow researchers to prime goal motivation and control the time between 
the justification process and decision. The use of a non-personal vignette (i.e., a vignette in 
which a fictional character experiences a self-control dilemma), may be critiqued for failing to be 
personally relevant for any or all participants. On the other hand, the use of hypothetical 
participant-involved vignette (i.e., a vignette that requires participants to respond to a self-control 
challenge as themselves), brings forth a number of substantial issues (e.g., goal salience, 
temptation strength). In our prior vignette study (Hill & Veilleux, in preparation), we were able 
to state Taylor’s desire to maintain a healthy lifestyle up front, which emphasized the salience of 
the self-control dilemma (i.e., to engage or not to engage in a healthy behavior). Additionally, the 
justification process and self-control decision happened simultaneously, which more closely 
aligned with how the justification process likely plays out in real life.  
Summary of Results 
Overall, results suggest justification can increase positive affect, albeit inconsistently. 
Our results also suggest that recall of past healthy behavior does influence self-control, although 





than engage in, temptation). Recall of past healthy behavior appeared to facilitate, rather than 
hinder, self-control; however, our results suggest justification does influence self-control 
decisions. Finally, we did not find evidence that recall of past healthy behavior increases 
enjoyment of temptation. Taken together, our results suggest recall of past healthy behavior does 
not consistently increase positive affect, nor does it propel people toward their temptations; in 
these studies, recall of healthy behavior did not license misdeed or provide a justifiable excuse 
for engaging in temptation. Although our studies represent one of the first attempts to investigate 
justification and emotion, additional work is needed in order to better understand both the 
differences and similarities between self-licensing and justification, as well as the relationship 









Bai, H. (2018, August 10). A proposed procedure for testing the evidentiary value of responses 
from duplicated GPS sources. Retrieved from https://www.maxhuibai.com/blog/a-
proposed-procedure-for-testing-the-evidentiary-value-of-reponses-from-duplicated-GPS-
sources-comments-invited-.  
Balleine, B., & Dickinson, A. (1991). Instrumental performance following reinforcer devaluation 
depends on incentive learning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 43B, 279-
296.  
Blechert, J., Meule, A., Busch, N. A., & Ohla, K. (2014). Food-pics: an image database for 
experimental research on eating and appetite. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 617. 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00617 
Bostyn, D.H., Sevenhant, S., & Roets, A. (2018). Of mice, men, and trolleys: Hypothetical 
judgment versus real-life behavior in trolley-style moral dilemmas. Psychological Science, 
29, 1084-1093. doi:10.1177/0956797617752640 
Brown, R. P., Tamborski, M., Wang, X., Barnes, C. D., Mumford, M. D., Connely, S., & 
Devenport, L. D. (2011). Moral credentialing and the rationalization of misconduct. Ethics 
and Behavior, 21, 1-12. doi:10.1080/10508422.2011.537566 
Cyders, M. A., Smith, G. T., Spillane, N. S., Fischer, S., Annus, A. M., & Peterson, C. (2007). 
Integration of impulsivity and positive mood to predict risky behavior: Development and 
validation of a measure of positive urgency. Psychological Assessment, 19, 107–118.  
Cyders, M.A., Littlefield, A.K., Coffey, S.C., & Karyadi, K.A. (2014). Examination of a short 
English version of the UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale. Addictive Behaviors, 39, 1372-
1376.  
De Witt Huberts, J. C., Evers, C., & De Ridder, D. T. (2012). License to sin. Self-licensing as 
underlying mechanism of hedonic consumption. European Journal of Social Psychology, 
42, 490-496. doi:10.111/j.1751-9004.2010.00263.x 
De Witt Huberts, J. C., Evers, C., & De Ridder, D. T. (2014). "Because I am worth it." A 
theoretical framework and empirical review of a justification-based account of self-
regulation failure. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18, 119-138. 
doi:10.1177/1088868313507533 
Diener, E., Wirtz, D., Tov, W., Kim-Prieto, C., Choi, D., Oishi, S., & Biswas-Diener, R. (2010). 
New well-being measures: Short scales to assess flourishing and positive and negative 
feelings. Social Indicators Research, 97, 143-156.  
Duckworth, A. L., & Kern, M. L. (2011). A meta-analysis of the convergent validity of self-





Evers, C., Stok, F. M., & de Ridder, D. T. D. (2010). Feeding your feelings: Emotion regulation 
strategies and emotional eating. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36, 792-804.  
Fedoroff, I. C., Polivy, J., & Herman, C. P. (2003). The specificity of restrained versus 
unrestrained eaters' responses to food cues: general desire to eat, or craving for the cued 
food? Appetite, 41, 7-13. doi:10.1016/S0195-6663(03)00026-6 
Field, M., Rush, M., Cole, J., & Goudie, A. (2007). The smoking Stroop and delay discounting in 
smokers: effects of enviromental smoking cues. Journal of Psychopharmacology, 21, 603-
610.  
Fujita, K. (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition of 
impulses. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 352-366. doi: 
10.1177/1088868311411165. 
Gable, P. A., & Harmon-Jones, E. (2008). Approach-motivated positive affect reduces breadth of 
attention. Psychological Science, 19, 476-482.  
Geisler, F. M., Kleinfeldt, A., & Kubiak, T. (2016). Restrained eating predicts effortful self-
control as indicated by heart rate variability during food exposure. Appetite, 96, 502-508. 
doi:10.1016/j.appet.2015.10.020 
Grillo, C. M., & Shiffman, S. (1994). Longitudinal investigations of abstinence violation effect 
in binge eaters. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 62, 611-619.  
Hagger, M. S., Leaver, E., Esser, L., Leung, C. M., Te Pas, N., Keatley, D. A., … & 
Chatzisarantis, N. L. (2013). Cue-induced smoking urges deplete cigarette smokers' self-
control resources. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 46, 394-400.  
Herman, C. P., & Polivy, J. (1980). Restrained eating. In A. J. Stunkard (Ed.), Obesity (pp. 208-
225). Phildelphia: Saunders.  
Hill, M. A., & Veilleux, J. C. (2018). Justification facilitates mood repair following self-control 
failure: An investigate pilot study. Manuscript in preparation.  
Hofmann, W., Friese, M., & Wiers, R. W. (2008). Impulsive versus reflective influences on 
health behavior: A theroetical framework and empirical review. Health Psychology Review, 
2, 111-137. doi:10.1080/17437190802617668.  
Hofmann, W., Friese, M., & Strack, F. (2009). Impulse and self-control from a dual-systems 
perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 162-176. doi:10.1111/j.1745-
6924.2009.01116.x 
Hofmann, W., & Van Dillen, L. (2012). Desire: The new hot spot in self control research. 





Hofmann, W., Kotabe, H. P., & Luhmann, M. (2013). The spoiled pleasure of giving in to 
temptation. Motivation & Emotion, 37, 733-742.  
Hofmann, W., Adriaanse, M., Vohs, K. D., & Baumeister, R. F. (2013). Dieting and the self-
control of eating in everyday environments: An experience sampling study. British Journal 
of Health Psychology, 19, 523-539. doi:10.1111/bjho.12053 
Joorman, J., & Siemer, M. (2004). Memory accessibility, mood regulation, and dysphoria: 
Difficulties in repairing sad mood with happy memories? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 
113, 179-188. doi:10.1037/0021-843X.113.2.179 
Jordan, J., Mullen, E., & Murnighan, J.K. (2009). Maintaining a less than perfect moral 
equilibrium: The paradoxical effects of past moral behavior. Manuscript submitted for 
publication.  
Khan, U., & Dhar, R. (2006). Licensing effect in consumer choice. Journal of Marketing 
Research, 43, 259-266. doi:10.1509/jmkr.43.2.259 
Marlatt, G. A., & Gordon, J. R. (Eds). (1985). Relapse prevention: Maintenance strategies in 
addictive behavior change. New York: Guilford Press.  
Mazar, N., & Zhong, C. B. (2010). Do green products make us better people? Psychological 
Science, 21, 494-498. doi: 10.1177/0956797610363538 
Merritt, A. C., Effron, D. A., & Monin, B. (2010). Moral self-licensing: When being good frees 
us to be bad. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4, 344–357. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00263.x 
Merritt, A. C., Fein, S., & Savitsky, K. (2009). The strategic accumulation of moral credentials. 
Manuscript in preparation.  
Metcalfe, J., & Mischel, W. (1999). A hot/cool-system analysis of delay of gratification: 
Dynamics of willpower. Psychological Review, 102, 419-457.  
Monin, B., & Miller, D. T. (2001). Moral credentials and the expression of prejudice. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 33-43. doi:10.1037/00223514.81.1.33 
Mukhopadhyay, A., & Johar, G. V. (2009). Indulgence as self-reward for prior shopping 
restraint: A justification-based mechanism. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 19, 334-345. 
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2009.02.016.  
Muraven, M., & Slessareva, E. (2003). Mechanisms of self-control failure: Motivation and 







Papies, E. K., Stroebe, W., & Aarts, H. (2008). Healthy cognition: Processes of self-regulatory 
success in restrained eating. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 291-299. 
doi:10.1177/0146167208320063 
Pizarro, D. A., Uhlmann, E., & Salovey, P. (2003). Asymmetries in judgments of moral blame 
and praise: The role of perceived metadesires. Psychological Science, 14, 267-272.  
Polivy, J., & Herman, C. P. (1985). Dieting and binge-eating: A causal analysis. American 
Psychologist, 40, 193-204.  
Ryan, T.J. (2018, August 12). Data contamination on MTurk [web blog post]. Retrieved from 
http://timryan.web.unc.edu/2018/08/12/data-contamination-on-mturk/.  
Sachdeva, S., Iliev, R., & Medin, D. L. (2009). Sinning saints and saintly sinners: The paradox of 
moral self-regulation. Psychological Science, 20, 523-528. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02326 
Salovey, P., Mayer, J. D., Goldman, S. L., Turvey, C., & Pilfai, T. F. (1995). Emotional 
attention, clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the Trait Meta-Mood 
Scale. In J. W. Pennebaker (Ed.), Emotion, disclosure, and health (pp. 125-154). 
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.  
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983) Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: 
Informative and directive functions of affect and stress. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 45, 513-523.  
Schwarz, N. (2000). Emotion, cognition, and decision-making. Cognition and Emotion, 14, 433-
440.  
Strack, F., & Deutsch, R. (2004). Reflective and impulsive determinants of social behavior. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 220-247. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_1 
Stroebe, W., van Koningsbruggen, G. M., Papies, E. K., & Aarts, H. (2013). Why most dieters 
fail but some succeed: A goal conflict model of eating behavior. Psychological Review, 120, 
110-138.  
Tamir, M. (2009). What do people want to feel and why? Pleasure and utility in emotion 
regulation. Current Direcions in Psychological Science, 18, 101-105. doi:10.1111/j.1467-
8721.2009.01617.x 
Tice, D. M., & Bratslavsky, E. (2000). Giving in to feel good: The place of emotion regulation in 
the context of general self-control: If you feel bad, do it! Journal of Personality and Social 






Veilleux, J. C., & Skinner, K. D. (2016). Introspective responses to cues and motivation to 
reduce cigarette smoking influence state and behavioral responses to cue exposure. 
Addictive Behaviors, 60, 103-108.  
Veilleux, J. C., Skinner, K. D., & Pollert, G. A. (in press). Examining the effect of cue exposure 
and introspective responses to cues on impulsivity in restrained and unrestrained eaters. 
Eating Behaviors.  
Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Schmeichel, B. J., Twenge, J. M., Nelson, N. M., & Tice, D. M. 
(2008). Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: A limited-resource account of 
decision making, self-regulatuon, and active initiative. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94, 883-898. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.5.883 
Watkins, P. C., Mathews, A., Williamson, D. A., & Fuller, R. D. (1992). Mood-congruent 
memory in depression: Emotional priming or elaboration? Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 101, 581-586.  
Whiteside, S. P., & Lynam, D. R. (2001). The five factor model and impulsivity: Using a 
structural model of personality to understand impulsivity. Personality and Individual 
Differences, 30, 669–689.  
Wohl, M. J. A, Pychyl, T. A., & Bennett, S. H. (2010). I forgive myself, now I can study: How 
self-forgiveness for procrastinating can reduce future procrastination. Personality and 


























Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
Demographics by Sample for Study 1.  
 Total mTurk (n = 130) Subject Pool (n = 135) Statistical 
Differences 
Age  26.58 (10.56) 33.96 (10.66) 19.49 (2.64) t = 15.31*** 
Gender  54.3% female 36.9% female 71.1% female  χ2 = 31.20*** 
Ethnicity  77.4% White 73.8% White 80.7% White χ2 = 1.80 









Differences Between Chosen and Non-Chosen Food Desirability and Deservingness Ratings by 
Condition in Study 2. 
Variable Condition Chosen Food Non-Chosen Foods p - Value 
Desirability Control 57.78 (32.88) 57.84 (20.57) p = .99 
Positive Affect 57.75 (29.84) 63.73 (19.59) p = .09 
Justification  61.84 (29.19) 55.52 (19.07) p = .07 
     
Deservingness Control 54.32 (34.70) 55.78 (25.10) p = .65 
Positive Affect 55.46 (32.29) 60.56 (26.12) p = .10 







Correlations Among Food Enjoyment Variables in Study 3 
 1.  2.  3.  
1. Smell  -- .72** .60** 
2. Appearance   -- .52** 
3. Taste   -- 








Participant Categorization of Food Items Based on Healthy Versus Unhealthy 
Food Item % Healthy % Unhealthy 
Strawberries 96.5 2.9 
Fries 10.4 87.2 
Lasagna  24.9 73.3 
Snack Mix 51.3 47.0 
Chocolate Cake  13.3 84.1 



















































































% of Participants Selecting an Unhealthy Food Item
Attention to Emotion (i.e., completed T2 SPANE)






Sample Participant Responses to Justification Condition Manipulation Prompts 
Condition Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 
Control  On Sunday I wore a pair of 
slip-on shoes. They are 
made of a soft and thin 
Black wool than is 
comfortable and keeps my 
feet cool and insulated. 
On Sunday I wore a 
band t-shirt. The band 
is Weekend Nachos and 
the front is a black and 
white picture of a rose 
on the ground with 
blood around it. The t-
shirt itself is black, and 
the lettering is green. 
On Sunday, I wore 
golf shoes, shorts, and 
a polo. They were 
classy and useful. 
Positive 
Affect 
My mom left me a nice note. 
It was thoughtful. 
On Sunday, my 
husband helped me to 
set up my new fax 
machine. 
On Sunday, a shopper 
let me get in line in 
front of them because 
I only had a few items. 
They didn't make me 
wait while they 
checked out a cart full 
of items. 
Justification  On Monday, I made a 
healthy smoothie even 
though I was pressed for 
time. 
On Wednesday, I went 
to bed early instead of 
staying up all night. 
On Saturday, I ate a 
salad for lunch instead 
of eating a hamburger. 







Food Demographic Information 
Food Category Profile Image Fat Total* kCal* % 
Chosen 
Overall 
Potatoes Healthy Savory 
 
3.3 184.5 20.1 
Lasagna Unhealthy Savory 
 
17.85 430.50 10.8 
Strawberries Healthy Sweet 
 
0.43 5.86 17.1 
Chocolate 
Cake  
Unhealthy Sweet  
 
18.48 450.00 9.7 
French Fries Unhealthy Salty 
 
22.10 435.00 29.7 
Snack Mix Healthy Salty 
 
0.10 69.40 12.6 
 Note. Profile categories were designated by researchers. Fat total and kCal values came from the 
food.pics database (Blechert et al., 2014).  
 
 
